Fraud and Waste in Iraq

$69.27 Million Uncompleted Iraqi Army Facilities

In July 2005, Ellis Corporation, an American contractor, was awarded $69.27 million to construct facilities for the Iraqi Army’s 4th Brigade of the 6th Division at Mahmudiya. Citing poor management problems, the project was terminated by mutual agreement between the U.S. government and the company. Regardless, the contractor was paid the full contract even though the facilities were never completed.



$10 Million Partially Completed Iraqi Barracks

An Iraqi contractor was hired by the U.S. government to construct an Iraqi National Guard battalion barracks. The task order was modified six times, and increased funding to roughly $10.6 million. But the contractor was unable to make progress and SIGIR identified leaking septic tanks, latrine sinks pulling away from the wall and structural failures so the project was terminated for default in March 2007. Still, the contractor was paid the full contract amount of $10.6 million. One month later, another Iraqi company was awarded $328,000 to complete the project. It was finished s

even months later.



$100,000 Uncompleted Dawoo Al Hassan Compact Water Treatment Project

The project was terminated shortly after the contractor was awarded an advanced $100,000. He reportedly took the money and fled to Syria, and nothing was ever built.



$40 Million Uncompleted Khan BaniSa'ad Prison

In May 2004, the U.S. government awarded Parsons

Delaware, a U.S. construction company, $80 million to build the Khan Bani Sa’ad Prison, which was supposed to add 3,600 beds to the province’s correctional capacity. In 2006, three months after the prison was supposed to be completed, Parsons asked for another two and a half years to complete the project.  Citing “massive cost overruns, the request was rejected.  Instead, the U.S. government signed new contracts to complete the work, which was suspended in 2007. The project which had already cost the U.S. $40 million was then transferred to Iraq’s Ministry of Justice despite the fact that the ministry made clear they did not plan to complete the building.  In 2008, SIGIR visited the site to find it completely abandoned and completely unsecure, deeming Parson’s workmanship to be“poor-quality” and “potentially dangerous.” The site still sits dormant in Diyala and apparently will never be used.

Read more at http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Media/Slideshow/2013/03/25/Iraq-Spending.aspx?index=8#vq4VTixCzSG6vBuD.99


$277 Million Uncompleted Nassiriya Water Treatment Plant

The wastewater treatment plant in Nassiriya cost $277 million and is widely viewed as a failure…Probably because the project was supposed to serve 550,000 people in five surrounding cities, but was build without access to reliable and affordable electric power supply. The final project, completed in 2010, ended up produce “murky water” that local residents weren’t able to use.


$27 Million Uncompleted Mosul Dam

In 2005, the U.S. government awarded 21 contracts totaling $27 million to repair the poorly constructed Mosul Dam, which was supposed to supply drinking water, irrigation, flood control and hydroelectric power to the surrounding region on the Tigris River. However, when SIGIR inspectors visited the dam two years later, they found that no one had been monitoring the project and at least $19.4 million worth of equipment and materials were not being used.

Read more at http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Media/Slideshow/2013/03/25/Iraq-Spending.aspx?index=6#LVQP2PeGIfcaj6yv.99

$243 Million Uncompleted Healthcare Program

In 2004, the U.S. awarded contractors $243 million to construct and equip 150 primary healthcare centers across the country.  In 2007, however, SIGIR found that not even half of the facilities had been implemented, and the centers that had were poorly constructed. The slowed production, lack of oversight and poor performance by contractors added more than $100 million to the project’s pricetag. It eventually cost the U.S. $345 million tax dollars to build and equip 133 primary health care centers, short of the original request, and the centers were still in poor quality upon SIGIR’s final inspection.


$3,000 Circuit Breaker (Real Cost $94.47)

The same Saudi Arabia-based contractor, Anham, charged the U.S. $3,000 for a circuit breaker valued at $94.47 (a 3,076 percent markup)

Read more at http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Media/Slideshow/2013/03/25/Iraq-Spending.aspx?index=3#oVed2JAcMZbZqUoV.99




$900 Control Switch (Real Cost $7.05)

In 2007, the DOD awarded a $300 million contract to Anham, a Saudi Arabia-based contracting company, to operate and maintain two warehouses.  By 2009, the contract had incurred new costs of approximately $119.1 million. SIGIR looked into the Defense Contract Audit Agency and found that it had failed to review Anham’s cost-estimating system- this was quite apparent when SIGIR found that Anham had charged the U.S. $900 for a $7.05 control switch, a 12,666 percent price mark up.






$14 Concrete Slab (Real Cost $3.46)

Contractors spent $14 per square meter of concrete (estimated to cost $3.46 per square meter) to build living quarters for doctors as part of the Basrah Children's Hospital.


By BRIANNA EHLEY, The Fiscal Times
March 26, 2013

Billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars have been wasted in the Iraqi desert in the form of abandoned prisons, hospitals and water treatment plants. The U.S. government’s reconstruction efforts were supposed to be the glue that would bind a long-term partnership with the new Iraqi leadership and win the hearts and minds of citizens in the war-torn region after the American invasion ten years ago.

Between 2003 and 2012, the U.S. spent an average of $15 million a day on Iraq reconstruction, running up a tab of more than $60 billion. At least $8 billion has been lost to contract abuse and mismanagement, according to a final audit released this month by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).

In the report, SIGIR details a handful of multimillion-dollar projects, riddled with cost-overruns that were either poorly constructed or never completed and left abandoned. The list includes everything from a $277 million water treatment plant that was so carelessly built by American contractors that it can only produce “murky water” to a $165 million dollar Children’s Hospital that went 200 percent over budget and still isn’t complete.



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In one instance, Special Inspector General Stuart Bowen, Jr., recounted a conversation he had with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki about a local school refurbishment project, in which the school administrator had requested $10,000 to cover construction costs. The U.S. insisted on doling out $70,000 instead, an “unneeded waste,” according to al-Maliki. Though $70,000 is a relatively small amount compared with many of the other projects detailed in the report, it demonstrates how generously the U.S. government was spending taxpayer dollars, even when it wasn’t requested.

This was just one of the many instances where money was spent on projects with little or no oversight, resulting in major cost overruns. But SIGIR’s report includes many more examples of wasteful spending that was commonplace in Iraq during the nine years U.S. forces occupied the region.

Here are some of SIGIR’s findings:

$419.1 Million to Operate Two Warehouses
Would you pay $900 for a tiny control switch that has a market value of $7.05? Probably not. But the U.S. government did. In 2007, DOD awarded a $300 million contract to Anham, LLC, to operate and maintain two warehouses. By 2009, the contract had incurred new costs of approximately $119.1 million. SIGIR looked into the Defense Contract Audit Agency and found that it had failed to review Anham’s cost-estimating system; this was quite apparent when SIGIR found that Anham had charged the U.S. $900 for a $7.05 control switch, a 12,666 percent price mark up. In another case, Anham billed U.S. taxpayers $80 for a tiny segment of a drain pipe that was valued at $1.41; that’s a 5,574 percent price markup. And in another case, Anham charged taxpayers $3,000 for a $94 circuit breaker, a 3,076 percent price markup. In total, SIGIR questioned 40 percent of Anham’s bill.

$345 Million for Primary Healthcare Centers
In 2004, the U.S. awarded contractors $243 million to construct and equip 150 primary health care centers across the country.  In 2007, however, SIGIR found that not even half the facilities had been implemented, and the centers that had were poorly constructed. The slowed production, lack of oversight and poor performance by contractors added more than $100 million to the project’s pricetag. It eventually cost the U.S. $345 million tax dollars to build and equip 133 primary health care centers, short of the original request, and the centers were still in poor quality upon SIGIR’s final inspection.

$277 Million for Nassiriya Wastewater Treatment Plant       
The wastewater treatment plant in Nassiriya cost $277 million and is widely viewed as a failure. The project was supposed to serve 550,000 people in five surrounding cities, but was built without access to a reliable and affordable electric power supply. The final project, completed in 2010, produced “murky water” that was not drinkable.

$ 165 Million for the Basrah Children’s Hospital
The Basrah Children’s Hospital, originally estimated to cost $50 million, eventually totaled $165 million. The hospital was the largest individual health care construction project in Iraq’s reconstruction effort and was meant to be a 94-bed “state-of-the-art” pediatric oncology hospital. The combination, however, of bad work site conditions, poor contractor performance and deteriorating security increased the price to $165 million. The hospital was completed and opened for limited treatment in 2010, four years behind schedule. Still, in late 2012, SIGIR found that there was still equipment procurement, installation and employee training that had not yet been completed.

$40 Million for the Khan Bani Sa’ad Prison
In May 2004, the U.S. government awarded Parsons Delaware, a U.S. construction company, $80 million to build the Khan Bani Sa’ad Prison, which was supposed to add 3,600 beds to the province’s correctional capacity. In 2006, three months after the prison was supposed to be completed, Parsons asked for another two and a half years to complete the project. Citing “massive cost overruns, the request was rejected. Instead, the U.S. government signed new contracts to complete the work, which was suspended in 2007. The project, which had already cost the U.S. $40 million, was then transferred to Iraq’s Ministry of Justice despite the fact that the ministry had made clear it did not plan to complete the building. In 2008, SIGIR visited the site to find it completely abandoned and completely unsecure, deeming Parson’s workmanship to be “poor-quality” and “potentially dangerous.” The site still sits dormant in Diyala and apparently will never be used.

$27 Million for the Mosul Dam     
In 2005, the U.S. government awarded 21 contracts totaling $27 million to repair the poorly constructed Mosul Dam, which was supposed to supply drinking water, irrigation, flood control and hydroelectric power to the surrounding region on the Tigris River. However, when SIGIR inspectors visited the dam two years later, they found that no one had been monitoring the project and at least $19.4 million worth of equipment and materials were not being used.

$ 67.7 Million for Fighting Corruption
The U.S. established the Commission on Public Integrity in 2004, to help Iraq fight against corruption. As of September 2012, the U.S. had obligated $67.7 million for U.S. anti-corruption efforts in Iraq. But according to an audit from SIGIR, little had changed between 2003 and 2012.

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21/12/2012 (23:00 pm) - The number of readings: 137 - Issue (2683)
The report of the Office of Financial Supervision (6)
The report of the Office of Financial Supervision (6)


Baghdad / term

* Financial awarded 7 trillion dinars advances outside the budget did not register foreign loans and grants

I got the "long" the full text of the report of the Office of Financial Supervision in 2011, which will be presented to the reader countless surprises through the rings. The Bureau of the oldest institutions of the Iraqi state which distributes copies limited each winter for its annual report on fiscal spending witnessed all government departments during the previous year. In this report, a unique advantages, the first being that it reveals information level disaster Diary state departments all, a show into the open for the first once being displayed legal language and professional audit and review meet and comparisons include previous years. second advantage that he did not issue against the ruling party, or against another block, but his books crew staff and find wide acceptance, and respected by the Prime Minister himself. The third advantage is that the BSA can through his powers of that up is documented to most of the information can not reporting accessible with this access right to him in a democratic system, but is deprived of access to this information to Parliament. Said the annual report to the Cabinet and also will notice Reader, involves substantial explicitly, it serves as a senior Iraqi recognition of the absence of the state in the terrifying details led us to these poor conditions. The state, through this report, acknowledges that within large areas of "non-state", and these spaces begin serious circles as a Council of Ministers, and does not end when the smallest village, as seen Followers of these episodes.

We will discover in turn that we have the full story of the Iraqi state in 2011, or "The Story of non-state in Iraq," if you like.

2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Issued by the following reports: -

Report financial data

Periodic report

Checking contracts

Other auditing tasks

Total reports

1

4

2

1

8

Below are the most important indicators of the comments received: -

A - Financial Statements

First - the headquarters of the ministry

Delayed the ministry to provide their financial statements to the court for two years / 2009 and 2010 where she presented its financial statements for the year / 2009 dated 31/3/2010 and returned to the ministry Baketaben numbered (4486.534) on (15/4 and 31/5/2010) and provided for the last time a book ministry No. (24 943) on 2/12/2010 and is not released to the presence observations and reservations are discussed at the meeting with representatives of the Ministry of 26.01.2012 and had been sent to the ministry.

And the effect can not issue statements / 2009 returned ministry data for the year / 2010 book Diwan No. (16323) in 23.01.2012 and submitted to the Court a ministry letter No. (2540) on 18/4/2011.

Secondly - Department of diplomatic missions

Ministry's financial statements presented to the Department of the diplomatic missions of years (2009,2008,2007) and after the examination has been re-year data / 2007 under SAI book No. (3438) in 12.02.2012 for the purpose of the amendments at the meeting held in the Cabinet on 26/1 / 2012 and the Foreign Ministry to prepare settlement statements required and sent to the Finance Ministry for approval and be included in the accounts for the year / 2012.

B - the Preparatory Committee for the Arab summit

First - noted that the ministry to enter into contracts for the processing of the materials and services despite the possibility obtained from inside Iraq, where the disbursed (345) million (three hundred and forty-five million dinars) for Okiem plants processed actually held processing roses and by the acceptance report and delivery ongoing between the parties to the contract contrary to the instructions and implementation of the general budget for the year / 2010 Article (3 / b), and also in the contracts listed below: -

Project Name

Amount / USD

Contracting Company (nationality)

Details

Contract processing and Rod

913,825

Flora Mundra / Lebanese

Has not been approached Baghdad Municipality about the possibility of providing the Commission with flowers.

Hospitality services contract

42,500

Rixos / Turkish

Has not been approached by the Ministry of Tourism to see the possibility of providing the service in hotels and villas

Secondly -

Expansion in the contract in favor of the Commission, where projects have been contracted to does not belong to the theme of the Summit, including: -

Project Name

Contract Amount

Executing company

Rehabilitation (7) role in the international zone

8977 million dinars

Saad General

Rehabilitation of the property (624)

1226 million dinars

Prince goodness

Rehabilitation Dome Square celebrations

$ 3000000

Eastern iwan

Rehabilitation residence

1249 million dinars

Leopard Mountain Contracting

The request of the Board of Supreme Audit to investigate contracts above.

Third - through field visit to Mansour Melia Hotel on 16/2/2011 and played Arab Contracting Company re-qualifying cost (33,500) thousand dollars (thirty-three million five hundred thousand dollars) has been marking a series of observations such as: -

(1) All paragraphs are open has not been done a specific paragraph from work site and terminations Foreign down Balanhaouat interior where not accomplish any paragraph in an integrated work of the first phase and of the work (the lounge, kitchen, guest rooms) until the date of the audit report.

(2) the delay in the completion of the rehabilitation and maintenance of the floor (I, III and V) from the hotel because of occupancy by the French news agency and the Chinese Ambassador (Chinese Embassy) and Waha oil respectively.

3. Ministry of Finance

Issued by the following reports: -

Report financial data

Periodic report

Performance Evaluation

Inspection visits

Checking contracts

Other audit tasks

Total reports

20

70

13

97

18

5

223

Below are the most important indicators of the comments received: -

A - the final account of the Republic of Iraq / 2009

First - delayed the Ministry of Finance to provide the final account of the Republic of Iraq for the year 2009 / Unlike date specified under Article (6) of section (11) of the financial management and public debt number (95) for the year / 2004, which provides for (on April 15 of the following year the Minister of Finance to prepare annual balance sheet, especially in the budgetary funds and submit it to the Office of Financial Supervision), where it was submitted to the Court, as the primary on 12/8/2010 by the ministry letter No. (9804) and after a number of amendments presented in its final form by a letter the Department of Accounting No. (10666) in 07.11.2011.

Secondly - did not take the Ministry of Finance is required for submission of financial reports provided for in Article (7) of section (11) of the financial management and public debt number (95) for the year 2004 / accompanied by financial statements for the year / 2009 and with respect to paragraphs listed in below: -

(1) report about the difference between budget revenues obtained and expenditure on the one hand and deficit financing or the use of surplus on the other hand.

(2) a report on the guarantees issued by the federal government during the year.

(3) The Minister of Finance to prepare a report on all loans regional and provincial governments and municipal governments and local communities.

(4) Amounts due for decades of capital.

(5) contracts undistributed profits.

(6) letters of guarantee funds have been allocated and did not receive goods allocated to them.

(7) The Minister of Finance to prepare a report on all the guarantees of regional and provincial governments and municipal governments and local communities.

III - The results of the implementation of the federal budget for the year / 2009 investment ongoing Moisntin as shown below: -

Details

Revised allocation / billion dinars

Verified / billion dinars

Execution rate%

Ongoing

54,118

54,941

84.89

Investment

15,639

 9648 9648 

61.69

Total

69,757

55,589

79.69

IV

- The continuation of the accounting department during the year 2009 / disbursing advanced to some government departments without corresponding allocation in the budget covered, totaled what was recorded on account of advances during the year amount (7148) billion dinars (seven trillion, one hundred and forty-eight million dinars) , note that we have not been able to check all the priorities of such advances and make sure there is a legal basis for granted, so as not to provide detailed disclosure Bembalgha and priorities approval granted in spite of its request.

V.

- Showed a check matching the current account of the Department of Accounting your local currency No. (70 009) and Almmsuk with the CBI submitted to us by the Department of cash accounts in the accounting department and there is a difference of $ (8,507,301) million dinars (eight trillion five hundred and seven billion and three hundred and one million dinars) between the corresponding balance under accounting department records under the bank statement balance as at 31/12/2009, note that we had previously reservation in our reports for the years prior to the cash balance in this account.

VI -

Account balances receipts and disbursements from the fund as at 31/12/2009 phenomenon in الكشفين elbows to the financial statements do not represent the true balances of amounts of movement but represent Fund balances computational net (clearing) after making withdrawals from Fund receipts, and therefore does not show receipts for what they are lead to inaccuracies in the disclosure of the fact balance of this account, as well as the case of payments with no show the amounts paid by the Fund to the Finance Ministry's account your Baltmwilat, leading to not show account balances mentioned Bembalgha real and private account balance oil revenues.

Seventh

- Despite assurances in our reports for previous years, the accounting and financial records of the Ministry of Finance does not show Iraq's obligations to third parties so far to not install those commitments restrictions accounting and thus show in accounting records to ensure oversight and control over these debts, and thus the final account for this year and previous years did not include balances of those debts have been relying on the control system existing statistical the Public Debt Department, and that the system used does not meet the needs of authentication for those debts for being not held positions annual debt stocks and movement shots and additions thereto, and this makes it difficult to identify and match those debts.

VIII

- Committed to the Iraqi government in recent years a number of agreements with foreign governments and international organizations spent to provide loans to the Government of Iraq in cash or goods and services, including (the Japanese loan, Italian, the World Bank loan) has been activated most of these loans in the last two years (2008 and 2009) and The beneficiaries of these loans are the various ministries and formations, both funded centrally or self It is noted that these loans that were agreed upon does not occur accounting entries documented in the records of the Ministry of Finance (Department of Accounting or in the circle of public debt), which led to not appear in the final account of the Republic of Iraq and so it has not been disclosed for these loans and the size of the obligations to the Iraqi government about them.

IX -

The presence of excesses on the allocations approved by the General Budget Law for the year / 2009 by some ministries and formations in exchange totaling (32.444) million (three hundred and twenty billion, four hundred and forty-four million dinars) and the aim of ending cases of abuse this is required from the Ministry of Finance to continue in urging departments to abide by certifying according to what has been allocated in the budget and accounting offenders according to the provisions of Article (5) of section 9 / of the financial management and public debt number (95) for the year / 2004, which states (units tunnels that do not adhere to the process of exchange increases what provision in the annual budget unless otherwise provided in the budget), that we had previously noted in our reports for the previous years.

B - of Cabinet

First - the law ministry and organizational structure

Still the ministry is working according to law No. (92) of 1981 (as amended) in spite of a number of changes to the structure through the creation of new departments have been modified organizational structure which (Economic Department, Public Debt Department, Department of Information Technology) was added circuits Other note that the ministry has prepared a draft of a new law includes all adjustments made ​​to the law where the width of the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers according to the ministry Book No. (7420) on 3/12/2007 and that the ministry has asked the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers to wait to take legislative measures at stake until the resolution of the proposed amendments to some formations, requiring the need for the ministry to follow up the resolution of the proposed amendments and to take legislative action to pass a new law suit and changes.

Secondly -

Investment projects budget allocations

I check results allocations of investment projects related formations (public administrations) of some ministries, many of the observations and constraints of the following: -

(1) delayed some ministries release funds for investment budget projects for its formations which are received within the headquarters of the ministry allocations which makes it difficult to follow-up and supervision by the formations and overlapping powers.

(2) the failure of the sub-departments to holding a book to control the amounts spent on projects being maintained by public administrations and overlapping schedules expenses to the headquarters of the ministry with senior management.

And has approached the Ministry of Finance in respect thereof under his book a number (2/5/5/8029) on 30/5/2011 stating that the rules of the preparation of the budget provides for the inclusion of the financial allocations within the budget of the beneficiaries (at the level of public administration) The budget of the ministry's headquarters, they are limited on projects that relate to at the ministry exclusively been to support the proposal by the Ministry of Finance (Budget Department, the Department of Accounting, Administrative Service) and showed that they will make the necessary on an individual independent budget for allocations of investment projects for public companies and funding bodies and the development sections have within the budget each section separately instead from the context in force after 9/4/2003 and incorporated within the allocations each ministry center.

Thirdly - translation accounting entries

Showed business control and audit conducted by the Office of Financial Supervision delayed the Ministry of Finance in the translation of the financial statements in several cases, including separate or merge accounts current budget with accounts of the investment budget and vice versa, and changing the funding from the accounting system central through (cupboards) to the accounting system decentralized In cases other integration or separation of decentralized finance departments or departments of self-financing, has pointed BSA typing No. (5144) 04.03.2012 sent to the Ministry of Finance that because of the confusion in the recycling credits to those who have fallen to the results of the merge or Chapter and the emergence of balances contrary to nature because of the lack of translation, as well as causing the delay of oversight and scrutiny and opinion the financial statements of the parties affected by the work of the merger and the separation.

IV

- Allocation of contingency reserve for the year / 2010

Article (6) of the General Budget Law for the year / 2010 (Federal Minister of Finance to use the amounts approved for a contingency reserve set forth in item (I) of Article (3) of the Act for the payment of incidental expenses and unexpected after entry into force of this law if there is an urgent need to agree the local and the lack of allocation to cover this need), but the results of the audit showed that orders drainage redeploy customization have been used mostly for cases not considered an emergency, which requires a commitment to apply the objective of the allocations when disposed and not considered a way to avoid overtaking on the allocations established under Budget Law.

V.

- Bank accounts Deposit No. (1002)

Showed Audit in the above there is a difference of $ (2469) million dinars (two billion, four hundred and sixty-nine million) between balance shown in the Daily Record public until 12/31/2008 and adult (2581) million dinars (two billion, five hundred and eighty-one million dinars) and the balance cash trochanter (opening) in 01.01.2009 and adult (112) million dinars (one hundred and twelve million) to organize the registration opening from the reality of a certificate existing cash and non-matching with a record daily general, note that the regulatory body operating in the headquarters of the ministry has been directed about her memoirs numbered (29) in 20/9/2010 not be answered, which requires the formation of an investigative committee and stay on the reasons for the difference above.

VI -

Record unification

Not accounting department to ratify the record unification ministry since 2009 / did not the ministry to give us a record of the uniformity of balancing current year / 2010 where he was sent to the accounting department was not returned until the date of the audit report in addition to the lack of maintenance of the Register uniformity for the investment budget for the year / 2010, which requires follow-up record authentication by the Department of Accounting and record-keeping uniformity of the investment budget.

Seventh

- Violation of the laws, regulations and instructions

The booking amount (3) billion dinars (three billion dinars) of expense account (cars) to account departments and others to buy cars on 30/12/2010 before signing the contract terms that the signature was on 22/3/2011 and $ (1059) million dinars (one billion and fifty nine million dinars) contrary to paragraph (1) of section (4) of the Financial Administration Act and the Public Debt number (95) for the year / 2004, which stipulates (acknowledges the budget for the financial year and take effect during the year approved its allocations unspent and approved will fall at the end of the financial year, except the point that where the goods and services had requested and received correctly), which requires compliance with the above law.




STATEMENT OF STUART W. BOWEN, JR.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS
“THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. EFFORTS TO COMBAT CORRUPTION,
WASTE, FRAUD AND ABUSE IN IRAQ”
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MARCH 11, 2008

The security challenges in Iraq, however, do not supersede the applicable rule governing the use of taxpayer dollars, and, in fact, the difficult environment increases the need for comprehensive on the ground oversight. Thus, SIGIR has been and remains committed to maintaining a robust operational presence in Iraq to provide effective oversight and real time review. Our collective reporting to date reveals a simple axiom: effective quality assurance programs carried out by the government and complemented by effective quality control programs performed by contractors will yield successful programs and projects. Where good quality assurance and quality control programs have been applied in Iraq, success has been achieved. SIGIR’s inspection reports document that the majority of the projects we have visited have met contract expectations and are being
used per their original intentions. However, of the 50 construction project assessments that were deemed a success, eight had inadequate design submissions, four had some form of inadequate construction, and two lacked sufficient attention to sustainability issues. Despite these findings, the overall rate of success is notable given the high security risks that have afflicted the program in Iraq.


See the 28 page pdf report attached at the bottom of the page.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Investigations

 

The SIGIR Investigations Directorate continues to actively pursue allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse in Iraq, with 101 active investigations as of September 30, 2011.

This quarter, SIGIR had 1 investigator assigned to Baghdad; 6 investigators at SIGIR headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; and 13 investigators working at offices in Pennsylvania, Florida, Texas, Georgia, Oklahoma, and California. Investigative accomplishments this quarter included 4 indictments, 3 convictions, and 3 sentencings. As of September 30, 2011, the work of SIGIR investigators had resulted in 35 arrests, 68 indictments, 57 convictions, and more than $154.7 million in fines, forfeitures, recoveries, restitution, and othermonetary results. Investigative accomplishments this quarter also included suspension and debarment action, including 4 suspensions, 11 proposals for debarment, and 13 debarments.

As a result of SIGIR's investigations, 9 defendants are awaiting trial, and 19more are awaiting sentencing. Figure 5.1 shows the increases in the number of judicial actions and monetary results achieved based on SIGIR's investigations.With prosecutors currentlyhandling a substantial number of additional cases, this trend is expected to continue. For a comprehensive list of convictions compiled by theDepartment of Justice (DoJ), see Table 5.2.

Read the entire SIGIR Investigations section from the October 2011 Report.


SIGIR notes these investigative activities this quarter:

  • A U.S. Marine Corps gunnery sergeant from South Carolina was charged with and pled guilty to his role in a scheme to steal military equipment worth $124,000 in Iraq. Read the entire story
  • An associate of a U.S. Marine Corps contracting officer in Iraq pled guilty to a money-laundering conspiracy charge. Read the entire story
  • A former U.S. Army lieutenant colonel was sentenced to prison for accepting illegal gratuities from contractors in Iraq. Read the entire story
  • A former U.S. Army sergeant was indicted for receiving stolen cash. Read the entire story
  • A retired U.S. Army colonelwas sentenced to 12 months inprison for her role in a bribery scheme in Iraq. Read the entire story
  • A former U.S. Army sergeant was sentenced for his role in a theft conspiracy. Read the entire story
  • A former U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) employee was charged with and pled guilty to accepting bribes from Iraqi contractors. Read the entire story
  • A contractor was indicted for lying to federal agents. Read the entire story


October 2010: Quarterly Report To Congress


Management of U.S. Reconstruction Transition

Under the terms of the current U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, all U.S. military forces are scheduled to depart Iraq by December 31, 2011. This quarter, continued withdrawal of U.S. troops proceeded apace, with the last U.S. combat brigade rolling out in August, signaling the end of Operation Iraqi Freedomand the beginning of Operation New Dawn. Concurrent with U.S. military reductions, the Department of State (DoS) is continuing to expand its presence. Over the next year, DoS will open several key hubs across Iraq and will assume responsibility fromthe Department of Defense (DoD) for police training. Overseeing these changes are General Lloyd Austin, who took command of U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) this quarter, and the new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, James Jeffrey.

Please address inquiries regarding this report to SIGIR Public Affairs by e-mail or by phone 703-428-1100.

This report is also broken out by Figures, Pictures, and Tables.

File Name
File Size
Date
October 30, 2010 Quarterly Report
12,034 KB
10/30/10
Message from IG about the Report
75 KB
10/30/10
Section 1: SIGIR Observations
1,568 KB
10/30/10
Section 2: Funding Iraq Reconstruction
2,323 KB
10/30/10
Section 3: Reconstruction Management in Transition
792 KB
10/30/10
Section 4: Developments in Iraq
6,171 KB
10/30/10
Section 5: SIGIR Oversight
370 KB
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Section 6: Other Agency Oversight
116 KB
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Highlights from the October 30, 2010 Report
302 KB
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Graphic from the October 30, 2010 Report
2,308 KB
10/30/10
Endnotes from the Report
215 KB
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Acronyms and Definitions from the Report
96 KB
10/30/09
List of Contracting Actions and Grants (Microsoft Excel)
8,302 KB
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Front Cover (High Resolution JPEG)
216 KB
10/30/10
All Appendices from the Report
658 KB
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Appendix A: Statutory Requirements
54 KB
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Appendix B: Cross-Reference of SIGIR Budget Terms
34 KB
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Appendix C: International Donor Assistance to the GOI
94 KB
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Appendix D: Completed SIGIR Inspections
64 KB
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Appendix E: Supsensions and Debarments
146 KB
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Appendix F: Detailed Summary of Other Agency Oversight
232 KB
10/30/10
Appendix G: Summary of U.S. Oversight in Iraq
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Mark Aldrich,
Jul 26, 2016, 1:07 AM
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